Creativity & Left-Brain Thinking in Education

            In class, it was acknowledged that a computer is incapable of creativity. Another topic we discussed was the robotization or reverse anthropomorphism of our mental processes and thinking styles, such that we’re becoming more of left-brain thinkers. This left-brain leaning is self-defeating because it is exactly the type of intelligence performed by artificial intelligence, and the type we can’t really compete in with artificial intelligence.

            Not long ago, I met with my advisor to discuss my future career plans, or lack there-of, really. Mentioning that academics had always been a somewhat backup plan and that, as I went along in college I became more and more comfortable in the academic environment. I also mentioned that I was considering cognitive science graduate school, mostly because this field is interdisciplinary and ambiguous, just like me. It turns out these two plans were completely incompatible. He proceeded to discuss the outrageous competition in the academic world, and its eventual demise. Not only are these positions hard to impossible to get in this job market, but also the entire structure of America’s college education will soon be unable to compete. We discussed how the cost of college makes less and less sense considering its financial demands (general tuition, student loans, interest and debt) during a time of economic hardship. What complicates this even more is that this is occurring in an increasingly technologic world. “Before you know it, these small liberal arts schools like Rhodes will disappear, and Harvard will offer degrees online, and you can attend an ivy league on your laptop,” I’m told…and my heart sinks. Not only would this type of educational software dismiss the college professor profession, but (I feel) it would also put an end to the spontaneous originality that fuels humanities classes.

            Ironically, my advisor points out that if I went into cognitive science, another potential career would be creating these programs. Immediately I knew this was not for me. Yet I definitely recognize the benefits these programs would provide. College education would be exponentially more accessible, more affordable, and more economical. I just cannot imagine studying philosophy and GSS online. Consider all the rants and unusual conversations we get into in our class. Consider the timing, humor, and sensations that make up the classroom experience. How could that translate to a computer, and how would this impact these disciplines? (I realize I’m being biased, and that creativity applies in the maths and sciences, but that further demonstrates my point.) Would educational software, let’s say post high school, be a gain or a loss? To me, it seems like this software would further roboticize our thinking, encouraging the type of skills that we no longer need (or can no longer compete with) in such a high-tech time.

Merely Phenomenological Intelligence

I'm glad that the topic finally came up in class today of whether, in our search for artificial intelligence, we are really only looking for a reduced version of humanity than adequately mimics thought processes (i.e. input-output are identical, a la the Chinese Room example). The consensus seems to be that what we mean by artificial intelligence is real humanlike intelligence, with all of the actual decision making capacity we ascribe to ourselves as humans, but the only tests we have so far developed measure solely whether a particular candidate for intelligence can plausibly replicate humanness. For example, the Turing Test and the Loebner Prize are not even concerned with whether the program competing can actually do humanlike activities, but whether it can convince several judges that it appears to participate in humanness. We are concerned only with the "intelligence" as it appears, not with how it is, and in doing this we fall into the same Kantian line of reasoning which the existentialists react against. Our quest for artificial intelligence should not only seek to create passable forgeries, but to really dig into the masterpiece that seems to be human being. Perhaps we are in a sort of bad faith with ourselves (as a species), symptomatically, in the way that we haven't yet constructed adequate tests of a computer program's intelligence. We hold so fast to an elevated notion of our transcendence that we don't even acknowledge the facticity of our inadequate evaluation methods. We lie to ourselves when we say that machines have not come close to our supposedly exclusive claim to consciousness when we haven't even allowed ourselves the chance to find out.

And in case you were worried: http://rt.com/usa/running-war-robot-darpa-754/.

Sartre's bad faith.

In Patterns of Bad Faith, Sartre says one can only become something when one is not and although he or she can become that something, but not the being of it or actually being that. That people are in transcendence and lying to himself. For example, homosexual man struggles and does not admit his mistake and therefore he is in bad faith. However, what about the others who judge homosexual as faults/wrong? They are looking at his action of that being and think he is that being. Isn’t that also a bad faith? Also, when the critic demands the guilty to confess his sin and the guilty does so, isn’t it also bad faith? Even if he is guilty, he had to state it and therefore it is actually not? Then, is the bad faith universalized in our culture?

It is interesting that “If man is what he is, bad faith is forever impossible” (228), meaning that since bad faith exists, man is not what he is and he can only show the actions of that being but never actually be that being. If we are obligated to be what we are, then we have no free will and we are acting based on the destined reasons. I understand that we can act in certain ways and express certain emotions but cannot be at being that action. Emotions such as sadness and happiness are what everyone experience in daily lives but no one can be the being of happiness and sadness. However, I do not understand that when one says that he is something, then he is actually not. For example, when one says he is happy, then he is actually not happy and when one does not say, or feel the need to prove his happiness, then he is genuinely happy. I can believe that I am really happy and say that I am. But by saying it, people will believe that I am not a happy being? Is everything then a bad faith? What if I really believe that I am happy? Or if lying to myself that I am happy actually makes me happy? Then would it still be a bad faith if my state of being changes due to the bad faith? Because there is self-fulfilling prophecy in psychology that events tend to occur depending on the person’s prediction or expectation. If it is true, then isn’t bad faith a universalized?

Sartre and Human Nature

            In his essay Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre defends existentialism from the claims that his philosophy is not human oriented and is merely a contemplative philosophy. Sartre points out that the concept of existentialism must be humanistic and ought not to be reproached as it has been. Throughout his essay Sartre brings up multiple points, examples, relations, and all that jazz. But for now I would like to discuss the quote that has been become the mantra of existentialism, the famous (and unintuitive) line: “existence precedes essence”.

            This line reverses the traditional metaphysical principle that essence precedes existence (thanks to Plato’s forms, Descartes’ ramblings, and nearly every other philosopher up until the 20^th century), meaning that the concept of human nature is only but a myth, for human beings begin from a subjective point and develop their own nature. Human beings, according to Sartre, emerge into the world and come by way of existence to define their own unique essence.

            Of course this line, while the promise of a person taking their fate into their own hands and constructing himself or herself through sheer personal responsibility is uplifting, this line comes with its complications. Trying to label human beings as being a freedom by which one acts their will upon the world ignores much of, if not all, neuroscience, physics, as well as social theory. Of course Sartre is well aware of his claims (being the anti-determinist that he is) being contrary to previous arguments, to try and ignore that 1) laws of nature do in fact exist and 2) every effect has a cause seems to me to be taking human freedom too far. For example, if we cannot try and determine how human beings act in relation to their world and to others, how can we possibly construct social theory?

            If human beings are pure freedoms, it appears as though we cannot properly categorize how a human being may act, but this is not so. True, while a human being does have several options as to how to act, it is possible that persons can make predictions based on probability as to how a person may act. Human beings do have a kind of instinct about themselves that is seemingly hardwired into our brains (fight or flight comes into mind).

            While I do feel a rush from reading Sartre’s philosophy, it does ignore too many details that I believe are essential towards understanding being, as well as human beings. What do y’all think? 

Not so different

It seems as if Sartre and Nietzsche would not agree on much based on what we have read in class. Nietzsche asserts that you cannot separate the doer from the deed. That is, we are completely defined by what we do and what we will, since there is no difference between them. Sartre maintains that humans are than what we do and in fact, when we do something we are only pretending to be the doer, but we are actually completely separate from them. By looking at things in the way Nietzsche does, Sartre would say there is a lot of Bad Faith flowing around by thinking we are only as much as we do, and that we are not being-for-ourselves. However, it does raise the question of this raises many questions of identity. If we only play at doing things and are not actually defined in anyway by what we do, who are we?

It was briefly discussed in class about how Sartre would that if someone did not partake in homosexual acts, then they were not homosexual, even if they had a desire to do these acts. However, the way our society seems to view it, if you have the desire for any sort of act, you are in someway identified as the actor of these. This seems rather in line with Nietzsche’s idea of the strong have will and therefore they act. It seems almost natural to us that we would be able to identify ourselves or be identified by the things we do, or the things we play as. In Sartre’s view, we have the freedom to choose what we play as or what we do not play as. We have the freedom to choose and if we deny this fact to ourselves, we are in Bad Faith. However, this could also be view as lacking the will to change what we play as, how Nietzsche would view it. So, the weak are those who lie to themselves and try to escape freedom and the strong are those who do not flee freedom. The strong have the will to choose, and the weak do not, and try to hide it from themselves by fleeing freedom.

In this way, Nietzsche and Sartre seem to be getting at the same idea. The only difference between them is the causality. Nietzsche would say that it is not a matter of freedom or choice, but that it is just intrinsic to the individual, while Sartre would say pretty much the opposite. However, their logics lead us to the same conclusion.

Sartre & Sexuality

            In Grace’s post last week, she talked about how humans cannot be characterized absolutely. This got me thinking about labels and stereotypes. The friend of the homosexual in particular imposes a label on his homosexual friend. Sartre calls the friend the champion of sincerity because not only does he want to label his friend as homosexual, but he wants his friend to label himself as well. But both the homosexual and his friend would be in bad faith through this action, as they would reduce the man to pure facticity, thus renouncing his freedom. He would be a homosexual such as a chair is a chair. This paints a quite confusing picture for our sexual identities.

            It also presents an interesting perspective on arguments for and against same-sex marriage. People against same-sex marriage who use biology to distinguish ‘natural’ heterosexuality as opposed to unnatural homosexuality are in bad faith. They use biology to justify their own sexuality, denying any personal freedom in them. These people deny homosexuality any facticity, and even resort to treating it as an illness. On the other side of the coin, those who support same-sex marriage that embrace homosexuality as natural and innate are also in bad faith. These people fix homosexuality as a bound facticity, and use biology as an excuse to explain same-sex marriage. Sartre complicates the role of freedom in our sexuality. Are we free to choose our sexual desires? (I think not.) Are sexual desires natural and given? Do/can we choose our sexual acts?

            Last week we debated whether sexual identity was based on desires or actions. We also touched on transexuality. We do not choose our sex—I think that much is clear. Some argue that we can choose our sexual desires, but I do not agree. What is clear however is that getting a sexual reassignment surgery is an act of freedom. A transsexual who undergoes this surgery explicitly transcends his or her assigned sex. Yet at the same time, this person becomes another facticity after the surgery. Is sexual reassignment surgery literally just another sex assignment? Is it pure transcendence or pure facticity? Stories of people who regret their sexual reassignment surgeries seem to point to pure facticity. Sex change regret demonstrates that both the male and female sex are mere facticities of the human body in that people still feel constrained as either sex. If we grant the sexed body complete facticity, this can serve as the ground for infinite sexist arguments and assumptions. But if we leave the body behind completely, we risk acting as though we are a pure transcendence.

Confessions of a Vegetarian

It is funny that Schaeffer references vegetarianism in his precis while discussing anguish:

     "I liken this to what is often the rationale for vegetarianism: “It’s a moral choice,  though I don’t think omnivores folks are immoral.” How could that be so? If a vegetarian/vegan thought it perfectly fine for everyone else to eat meat, then in what universe does s/he exist wherein it is not acceptable? The choice to not consume meat/animal by-products is necessarily a reaction against carnivorousness/omnivorousness."

I totally relate.

When I decided to be a vegetarian (I want to note that I don't actually avoid eating meat so much as buying it or condoning its purchase), I was making a moral choice.  I decided that the extent to which I believed food companies' actions to be truly horrific (disregard for animals as natural creatures and not meat-reserves, de-prioritizing of health and environmental issues as compared to making a profit, the government's complicity and contributions in all of this, etc.) indisputably trumped my appetite for meat.  I actually remember the exact, incredibly existentialist, Sartrian (?) moment in 9th grade: I had this incredible feeling of being free, being totally capable of making this moral call, being able to transcend any fact of meat being "delicious" or "difficult to avoid eating" because I truly believed that is just what I should do.  But this entailed (and still entails today) that I think revoking support of these food companies is what one should do, not just what I should do.

My claims about what only I should do are not actually moral: I (alone) should brush my teeth, I (alone) should find my cell phone, I (alone) should eat pizza tonight.  As SOON as you bring other people into the equation, the claim becomes UNIVERSAL and MORAL: I (and everyone) should go to class today, I (and everyone) should be nice, I (and everyone) should care about issues facing other people.  This is how our freedom turns each individual into a "legislator deciding for the whole of mankind"--by HAVING to choose a way for ourselves, we MUST make some judgement call about what is the BEST/ BETTER way to act and so make a MORAL claim about how one OUGHT to act.

If I did not think that "people ought not contribute to the horrors perpetrated by the large food corporations," then, quite frankly, why in the world would I withdraw my support by claiming vegetarianism?? I wouldn't.  Of course this is a huge PROBLEM for me (and perhaps this is the anguish Sartre speaks to): I do not want to look down on or judge people who eat meat.  I know that those people have standards and issues of their own and that I probably do something they would deem morally amiss.  But for as long as I am a vegetarian--and thereby believe in my cause--I MUST think of eating meat as a moral wrong.  Perhaps there is no way to fix this, and perhaps this conflict is simply evidence that I am human.

Is there an issue for any of you guys that resembles my vegetarian problem?  If I believe supporting food industries by purchasing meat is morally wrong, is it also wrong for me to dismiss meat-buyers as blameless, inoffensive people making a totally moral-independent decision?  How ought one act on their own personal-yet-universally-implied moral systems?