Bad Faith and Class Consciousness

Bad Faith and Class Consciousness 

As Sartre explains, to be in bad faith involves either the clinging onto facticity - the denial of one’s ability to transcend - or the escape into transcendence - to detach, to disconnect from material reality. This imbalance between material reality and the human freedom’s ability to work around it is calling to mind Marx’s concept of class consciousness, and the reification of Capitalism. 

According to Marxist theory, the nature of capitalistic economy includes its propensity to become reified. When the means of production are transposed from the labourers to the capitalists, the product of labour seems alien to the worker. The worker does not use his/her labour to produce useful product. Rather, the worker produces valuable product, product that the capitalist takes and sells. Thus, not only does the worker not work for his/her sake, but the products the worker produces is then assigned an exchange value and sold back to the workers. All in all, this form of economic production and exchange seems external and separate from reality; it by design makes the worker feel powerless, that s/he has no control. 

But in reality, this economic system is a very real product of human construction. Though it was implemented long before any of us were born, our complicity keeps it running. We are all assigned essential role’s in the capitalist machine, and therefore, our disengagement from the system would actually dismantle it. This concept, that one becomes aware of one’s crucial role in the perpetuation of capitalism is class consciousness. Moreover, class consciousness is - according to Marx - that which should enflame a revolutionary spirit; once one becomes aware of either his/her being exploited, or his/her being used to exploit others, one would not likely be very pleased with Capitalism. 

Thus, the relation - or contradiction -  of class consciousness and bad faith is clear. Under Capitalism, one is born into bad faith inasmuch as one is conditioned to believe either a) one’s material conditions are a product of nature (one is poor because one deserves to be, or conversely, one is rich because s/he is superior) and therefore cannot be transcended, or b) one’s material conditions have no affect on reality (the myth of social mobility). But it is when one harmonises facticity and transcendence that one achieves class consciousness. It is the realisation of one’s material conditions, and its effects of one’s trajectory in life, but intertwined with the knowledge that if we stand in solidarity against Capitalism, if we disengage, the system will be suffocated, starved, and will bleed out. 

What could Ecological/Environmental Philosophy have to do with Existentialism?

While Heidegger's concept of "thrownness" (Befindlichkeit) and Sartre's analysis that humans always find themselves in a situation we did not choose, may suggest that you didn't entirely choose to read this post, I shall first give some background information before talking about why I think ecological philosophy has important implications for existential questions. Hopefully, this will make the "thrownness" into my blog post may be less unsettling. 

Last night, I attended the first day of the 32nd Annual Spindel Conference at the University of Memphis. This year's topic is "The Lives of Human Animals", more information here. Now, the conference poster states that it focuses on the problem of identity in philosophy of mind and related areas like philosophy of biology, ethics, and metaphysics. Some of you are probably thinking that this is as far away from existentialism as one might get so I'll try to give you a better idea of my "big picture" for this post. What I intend to do here is to give a preliminary sketch of an argument that claims that ideas in contemporary ecological/environmental philosophy offer interesting insights, implications, and complications for the question, which is arguably at the heart of existentialism: “What is it to be a human being?”. I remain agnostic about the outcome of this attempt and decided to blog on it because if I’m wrong then I probably have some large misunderstanding of existentialism and considering that I’m in a class on it I should fix that if it is the case.

The talk at the Spindel Conference which provoked these kinds of thoughts was “How Organisms Persist” by John Dupré, a rather influential philosopher of science and biology. In order to prevent going on tangential discussions I will not try to provide a complete overview of professor Dupré’s account. What’s relevant is that Dupré advocates for a pluralistic model of science, a process ontology, and for reconceiving “human” as a process with stages, where a process is a dynamic stabilization. Other ecological philosophies argue we must recognize that humans are a part of the ecosystems we live in and not separate from nature; that our relations and interactions with other living things, nonliving things, the land, etc. crucially impact what it means to be human.  

My point in bringing in all this is because it questions what I think is one of the central assumptions of Western thought and especially existentialism: Individualism. I take it as pretty obvious that existentialism is incredibly concerned with the individual. If not, I believe the themes of boredom and the fact that Heidegger answers the question “what is dasein?” by saying it is the being that has its own being as an issue are strong evidence for the point.

Returning to the relation between existentialism and ecological philosophy, the latter challenges our tendency to ground and define everything in our understanding of our own being as individual beings, and thus, puts the burden of proof or justification on existentialism. I also think that environmental philosophy when combined with process ontology may offer a solution, new approach, or dissolution to existentialism’s concerns about what we are, alienation, and death. These concerns all rely on individual identity being the case.

How might an existentialist respond to these thoughts? It seems that the typical examples of existentialist thinkers held some skepticism towards science and I can see that being a likely path for their response, however I’m hesitant to discuss this path because I’m unsure if it will even be productive and develop the discussion.

I really enjoyed reading Sartre's essay of Bad Faith because I (and probably everyone else) can very much relate to the issue of bad faith. From as far back as I remember, various individuals of influence in my life (and tons of other cheesy tv shows, movies, books, etc) have always encouraged me to "just be yourself". Bullied? Just be yourself. Awkward? Just be yourself. If you "just be yourself" the world will work out and all of your problems will disappear. But everyone knows that this is so much harder to do than say.

Sartre's essay of bad faith asks these same questions that millions of individuals have asked before, in a perhaps more eloquent manner:

"If candor or sincerity is a universal value, it is evident that the maxim "one must be what one is" does not serve solely as a regulating principle for judgments and concepts by which I express what I am. It posits not merely an ideal of knowing but an idea of being; it proposes for us an absolute equivalence of being with itself as a prototype of being. In this sense it is necessary that we make ourselves what we are. But what are we then if we have the constant obligation to make ourselves what we are, if our mode of being is having the obligation to be what we are?"

This captures the issue so well--how am I supposed to be myself when I don't even know what or who I am? Further, by trying to just be myself, I find myself thinking so hard about acting as I would, it begins to feel artificial. Sartre gives the example of a student trying hard to pay attention in class, but after concentrating hard on trying to listen, trying to think and trying to sit still, he realizes that he hasn't heard a single word that his professor had said. I can't even count how many times this has happened to me. Take Sartre's other example of the waiter who is just a little bit too happy to be serving an overcrowded restaurant. By playing the part of upbeat waiter, is he making life more manageable or bearable? What he is in fact doing is acting in bad faith. 

So what does Sartre believe we should do to solve the issue of this artificialness? With the other example of the woman acting as though she was oblivious to her date's advances, would it be better to just stand up in disgust and tell the guy that she had no interest in being flirted with and then walk away? Would the waiter be happier if he was to walk sluggishly around the restaurant and begrudgingly take peoples orders? Obviously, we often act in bad faith for good reasons. 

Sartre's philosophy of bad faith definitely addresses issues which most, if not all, individuals deal with. On the surface, it seems as if the philosophy of bad faith deals heavily with interactions with other people, as it generally shapes why and how we act. But is there a way to take this philosophy further and create a sort of interpersonal ethics? If we know that people have a tendency to act in bad faith, how should we see and act towards other people? 

Would this be a negative, in the sense that we would constantly be wondering if someone was acting in bad faith? Or would we understand that everyone struggles with identity and we should be empathetic towards others? I would like to believe the latter, so hopefully it wouldn't be so hard to just be yourself. 

Freedom and Determinism

For Sartre, human beings are a freedom. I'm interested in the metaphysical side of this assertion which may or may not be fair seeing as how Existentialism generally rejects metaphysics as a whole from my understanding. Regardless, there does seem to be a nagging problem inherent in the fact that we operate under the assumption that we both (1) live in a deterministic universe ruled by cause and effect and yet (2) are free. We experience ourselves as free, i.e. we can conceive of different paths that we feel that we could take given whatever situation we find ourselves thrown into (pun intended). Yet we also experience the world as a place that seems to be ruled (on the macroscopic level at least) by cause and effect. Obviously, Nietzsche would simply take out the second assumption and just go with the first, no problem. And it is definitely a reasonable assertion to make that we are simply conditioned from a young age to perceive the different possibilities that one could take and assume that we CAN do any of those options. The seduction of language of course makes this issue all the more difficult to dive into because "cause" and "free" are all used in a variety of different ways (often in the same sentences). The entirety of Sartre's philosophy would be rendered null, however, if it is true that we are not metaphysically free. This is why I do not think that simply saying "We experience ourselves as free" is a strong enough justification for such a strong thesis.

Simply by virtue of the fact that we are capable of thinking of possibilities that could have been in the past and could be in the future does not mean that those possibilities actually could have been. We are capable of thinking of a lot of fictional things. The extent of Existentialist, individual, moral responsibility is a large burden to place upon people and it needs some stronger justification. I really do not have any answers to this question as I have been struggling with the question since I took my first philosophy course with Dr. J in freshman year. The two options I see as possible are the two extremes really, Hard Determinism or Indeterminism. They seem like the strongest candidates simply by virtue of the fact that they do not seem to rest upon definitions that we ourselves made then applied to the world, but rather on actual observations as to how the world works. They also conceptually seem the least pleasing, however. Of course, these both raise the question of the possibility of objective observation. Do we actually perceive the world the way it is, or does the world conform to our understanding based on our brain chemistry and the mediums through which we observe the world? If this is the case, I suppose the best we would be able to say at this point is that we experience ourselves as free and proceed from here. But that's no fun. So this is basically my question. Determinism, compatibilism, or indeterminism? Why?...have fun trying to answer that in a couple hundred words. I had enough problems trying to phrase the question in 500.

Bad Faith and Absolutes

In "Being and Nothingness," Sartre addresses the idea of bad faith. Bad faith is lying to oneself, and denying that as a human being, one is characterized by both facticity and transcendence. Sartre's woman on a date tries to ignore her facticity and act as a pure transcendence, while his waiter in a cafe attempts to be pure facticity and ignore transcendence. Both lie to themselves about the existence of a major component of their being. With facticity and transcendence, humans cannot be characterized absolutely: you cannot be pure facticity or pure transcendence.

Should this lack of absolutes be extended to other characterizations as well? If one classifies himself as "a happy person," it seems to rule out the possibility of him ever experiencing sadness. Thus, any attempt to label ourselves as a certain type of person is misguided, as it discounts when we do not act as that type (i.e. a waiter) and it limits our potential to the label we have assigned ourselves. In order to fully realize our freedom, we must avoid thinking of ourselves in terms of absolutes.

Ted Cruz and Bad Faith

After reading the excerpt from Sarte’s “Being and Nothingness” and discussing it in class today, my mind jumped to the recent case of Senator Ted Cruz and his little “filibuster.” For those of you who missed all twenty one hours of it, the highlights are below, courtesy of the daily beast.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/25/highlight-reel-11-craziest-moments-from-ted-cruz-s-quasi-filibuster.html

This particular event and the man behind it seemed ripe with parallels to Sarte’s classification of the human condition, first of all, because of Cruz’s obvious exhibition of his inner being-for-itself (or being-for-himself, one might say). In setting the project of talking at length against a bill to defund the Affordable Care Act (or as it is commonly derogatorily referred to as if the president’s very name were a slight, Obamacare)- which he himself is against- in order to not actually make any difference in the proceedings but only to delay them (again, not until a window for voting had passed as would be the case if this were an actual filibuster), Cruz distanced himself from his identity as a being-in-itself which is fixed to its station, and instead projected a delusional vision of himself as the republican analog to Wendy Davis. At the same time, he engaged his inner being-in-itself by sticking to his senatorial demeanor even throughout the entirety of the ridiculous charade. Whether masquerading as a person worthy of the title of lawmaker was a conscious action does not effect his stance as embodying being-in-itself, for even in the midst of transcendence, the acknowledgement of the need for facticity is a mode of “bad faith.” His pointless, self-serving 15 (+1245) minutes of fame epitomized the paradoxical and inescapable nature of humankind as Sarte details it, and at least for that poignant reason, I’m glad he was elected to waste all of our time.

We are all "they"

Da-sein always have a sense of “mine-ness” and individuality. Human beings cannot possibly know the conscience of others, which gives Da-sein the sense of “mine”. Da-sein is naturally individualized by the “mine-ness” of each one’s mind. Da-sein as a being Being in this world does not exist alone with one’s “mine-ness” but through a more collective sense. Da-sein exists through Das Man, or the “they” of the world. Da-sein, when Being-in-the-World, exist in average everydayness. This average everydayness is where Da-sein get their sense of self. Das Man is the outside factor that allows the realization. Human beings are the most “me” they can be when they are living in average everydayness. “They” have influence over Da-sein through the talk but it cannot be determined who “they” is. Das Man is everyone and no one.

Heidegger made me think of Schaeffer’s argument that existentialism and sociology are not contradictory. Through social conditioning, individuals can gain insight on how they want to live, whether it is sticking to the norms or branching off. Schaeffer said, more or less, that through sociology, individuals can see how societal standards have shaped their freedom. It all reminded me of Heidegger’s Das Man. Das Man gives Da-sein their sense of self in that their average everyday existence is the real Da-sein. In regards to sociology, the argument is that individuals can choose who they are and how they want to live after observing society. Das Man does not give a choice. The “they” is everyone (and no one) so individuals are inherently part of the average everydayness of the world. Both being able to step back and observe how society works and living in average everydayness with Das Man gives human beings a sense of self. Is staying mainstream a choice or possibly controlled by Das Man? 

The trouble with language

In both of the authors we read this week, there was an intrinsic issue with conveying things in written language. Though their issues were different, there is a common theme in what was at fault. This is that language is too restrictive in its structure. Nietzsche argues that language produces and reinforces this idea of separation of subject and verb, that is the separation of the doer and the deed. Heidegger, on the other hand, tries to use the language to express this very abstract concept of Being and of the human being Da Sein. However, despite careful choices of terminology to try and distinguish these vague concepts, the essays become clunky and hard to decipher. Nietzsche explicitly and Heidegger with his unwieldy sentences demonstrate how problematic and influential language can be. According to Nietzsche, the seduction of language has been instrumental in the enforcement and spread of the slavish mode of evaluation. The creation of the idea of a moral plane that is in between the doer and the deed seems to be entirely analogous to the idea of subject and verb. This seduces us to the idea that there is a choice involved with will and action, where Nietzsche would say there is no distinction to be made. Heidegger has a problem when he has to use the same word to describe three separate entities, which sound not be confused with each other. The strict rules of language often cause problems when discussing such complicated and abstract issues as being and morality.

However, there is a definite need for the strictness and simplicity that languages provides us. If we were to do away with the idea of subject and verb and instead focus on the action we would lose our sense of individuality and instead be what we do, and everyone who did the same thing would be the same person, as it were. Not only is this concerning in the sense of losing our identity and becoming something of a mob based solely on our will and actions, it would also be incredibly impractical. Who you refer to would change based one how their will and actions change. Though this is the idea Nietzsche is getting at, I cannot imagine a simple way to keep these things straight and simple at the same time. Also, introducing a new way to discuss the more abstract concepts would also take away from practicality of language. We would not need this whole new set of language for our everyday lives, so it would likely be soon out of use, as a language is determined by how many people speak and understand it.

So is there a way to change our language system so it is more conducive to what Nietzsche and Heidegger want without losing its necessary simplicity?

Responsibility and free will

How does a man become responsible for something? In Martin Heidegger's from Being and Time, he proposes that we, Da-sein exist through Das Man “The they”. In world, there are many statements such as “they said… is good” or “they said… is not morally right”. However, these are what Das Man said and I am not responsible for these statements. But still I follow and trust in those statements. Why do human beings trust in what they say? Is trusting Das Man’s statements also a free will? Da-sein, as an ontological being, is concerned about the world that he lives in, but still follows Das Man. If it has right to will and concern, why do Da-sein follow Das Man? And cause Heidegger to conclude that Da-sein cannot exist without the They? I guess it is because of Zuhanden. When there are already statement or beliefs about things such as the good or morality, people do not question it but just interact with it because the they is everywhere and they present judgment and decisions that Da-sein do not have to take responsibilities from. However, this action of not taking responsibility and following the they gives burdens to Da-sein in its average everydayness. The one that makes Da-sein an ontological being is that it has free will and concern for the world that it lives in. However, since the they decides every decisions and actions for Da-sein, it causes Da-sein to act without responsibility and free will. It is as if everyone was following this formula to good and superiority in its average everydayness rather than act in its own even if it was slavish.  

Also, why do people not want to take the responsibilities of their ideas and give credit to Das Man? Why don’t people go and take responsibility and have mine-ness? It is confusing because Das Man is therefore Da-sein in average everydayness but I remember Kierkegaard saying how through singular experience, individuals exist. If Da-sein consists of both “facticity” and “Existenz”, it has to find the midway to be in the world and to have personal choice at the same time. But how does one find the midpoint? Isn’t this decision also effected by idea of the They? Being in the world just through its existence but separating oneself from the world at the same time sounds unimaginable to me.

I just believe that if there are no responsibilities for my own decisions, then I also don’t have free will and I am not an ontological Being but just an ontic being. What do you guys think?

If You Can't Beat Neitzsche, Join Him...Kinda

Although for the most part we feel a kind of innate resentment towards Nietzsche because of his judgement of our values as "slavish," I think there are other aspects of our lives in which we have so-called "noble" values.  In particular, I think our culture's fervent support of capitalist ideals embody this noble mode of evaluation, and frankly I find these very-real values sad and disturbing.  For example, in economics (if not in other realms), we say things like "Go big or go home" or "It's a dog-eat-dog world," or something referring to the competition of the market as "Natural selection" or "Social Darwinism."  In all these instances, I see people genuinely valuing strength as strength and as good, and I see the "bad"--the small shops, the people who just can't compete with Walmart, farmers who can't sell crops cheaper than Kroger does--truly being a kind of non-consequential, nearly-irrelevant afterthought for those "good."

What this means to me is that we can imagine Nietzschean ideas having some sort of place in our own culture.  Although I personally have real moral problems with those particular economic values, I realize that there are some aspects of Nietzsce's philosophy which I feel are truly inspiring and even "correct" to an extent.  These portions include (1) the fabrication of the human 'subject'--"there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming" (Gen. of Morals 481)--and (2) the difference between a 'yes-saying' and a 'no-saying' kind of life--"a question of "how well disposed [...] you would have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal" (Solomon 101).

(1) There is a certain value, I think, to seeing human "beings" as human "doings" or "effectings" or "becomings."  It suggests that life is an activity, not a passive mode.  If we embrace this idea, we become less apathetic and more engaged in our activities.  It gives a feeling of life being a kind of project we set for ourselves in itself.  How this way of thinking about a human "doings" would affect our culture today, I don't know.

(2) "Yes-saying," especially in context of Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence" tale, seems to be a good aim, too.  As Louise indicated in class, I think there are some people for whom losing there free will would not be the worst thing in the world.  This idea would have negative consequences if adopted for how to live one's life, but provides a very wholesome, affirmative way to look at one's life.  Seeing everything that has happened, and indeed even everything that will happen, as determined can honestly take away a big weight I think.  Even if we act as if we have free will and also don't know the future, saying "yes" to your own inclinations and thoughts as legitimate seems like a positive move for me.

Can you think of other aspects of our culture that embody a noble mode of evaluation besides our capitalism?  Are there other parts of Nietzsche's philosophy that really stuck with you as an especially good or important point?  What aspects might we want to integate into our culture?

Yolo, right...?

Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence, that the finite series of events in life eventually and infinitely repeat, stands for a theory of meaning. I mean, just thinking about the prospect of this fate feels heavy. Let’s lighten up for a moment.

This comical image represents the irony of Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence among a society that recites the exact opposite, for a similar effect. We’ve all said it. We’ve all probably done it. The yolo culture is undeniable, inescapable—the phrase has utterly taken over all forms of social media, been absorbed into our music and clothing, and is actually tattooed on countless (cursed) people’s skin. It’s both a noun and a verb. Even religious groups and college application essays have incorporated the concept. Suffice to say, yolo has been a cultural craze.

Taken in context, yolo is often said to justify a night of booze, blowouts, and bad decisions. But let’s consider the doctrine of yolo without judgment.The idea is that there’s one chance, so have the best experience possible. ‘You only live once’ is a motto (ha) that promotes motivation and meaning in life’s activities. It encourages one to enjoy life, take risks, and live life to the fullest. Basically, make your ordinary life extraordinary. There is an emphasis on the current moment, a priority on the present. Yolo implies an immediacy, a now or never mindset. It is in this sense that yolo is ordinarily used—to set aside the past and future and overlook unfavorable consequences.

Nietzsche’s claim says something more like now and forever. Meditating on Eternal Recurrence gives me the same feeling of urgency and eagerness to experiment that yolo intends. Both aim to put an end to procrastination, and to consider whether your life is worth living. As Nietzsche expresses in different words, this could make or break you in the face of eternal recurrence. While eternal recurrence reckons each and every moment of your life, yolo only singles out the current one. Would we really want to relive all the yolo-induced consequences we’ve ever experienced? I’m talking infinite hangovers, valuable losing, injury-enduring.  Eternal recurrence seems to cover every time—past, present and future. Both ideas disapprove of procrastination, but eternal recurrence emphasizes the continual reliving of each choice’s consequences, while yolo (in it’s present use) does not observe the bigger picture that is one’s life. Although I find both ideas stirring, I think eternal recurrence inspires the positive and wisest actions. So, think twice before you yolo…?

One more:

Thoughts on Heidegger and the Messy Nature of Being

If one can only understand what the utility of Heidegger’s Being and Time is, one might need to rip the book to shreds or stay away from the engagement of Heidegger’s work. The trouble I find with trying to understand Heidegger’s text is that his vocabulary is too close to us. He reworks the utility of our very own language, and causes a great stress with the fact that his work appears groundless. True he provides categories for us to remember, and he tries to establish some sense of objectivity. Is this establishment part of being the Dasein? It’s hard to say. We are fundamentally being with Heidegger’s work alongside being with ‘the they’, but being thrown into the work and facing the pain of learning what it means to be a subject. For Heidegger, the question of our being is fundamentally the first question that ought to be answered, yet have we gotten any closer to seeing what it is to be? Perhaps the world that we have inherited, including our cultures and language, are improperly developed to allow for such an undertaking.

I apologize, I have turned to ranting and raving, but I believe that this rant is a significant part of being a Dasein, for all of us have been thrown into this world with the possibility of understanding, yet trying to contort ourselves into finding a project or activity that successfully gets us closer to seeing the truth leads me away from being my own self. It appears as though the analysis of our ‘selves’ forces the Dasein to move away from oneself, for it negates the presupposition of human-ness. If this is the case, then can Heidegger really have been an existentialist? Or is he just the fuel that allowed existentialism to flourish?

Another question, will we ever get to the question of Being? Or are we going to have to be stuck of dealing with the analysis of being a Dasein? If we are stuck doing questions that avoid the analytic approach of Being, is it possible for us to even conceive of Being?

Side note, if you are ever curious to listen to some fantastic philosophy, check out the www.partiallyexaminedlife.com website. Enjoy!

are you a bird of prey or a lamb?

The metaphor Nietzsche uses to explain Noble Values and Slave Values is the well known metaphor of the lambs and the birds of prey:

(T)he problem with the other origin of the “good,” of the good man, as the person of ressentiment has thought it out for himself, demands some conclusion. It is not surprising that the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey, but that is no reason for blaming the great birds of prey for taking the little lambs. And when the lambs say among themselves, "These birds of prey are evil, and he who least resembles a bird of prey, who is rather its opposite, a lamb,—should he not be good?" then there is nothing to carp with in this ideal's establishment, though the birds of prey may regard it a little mockingly, and maybe say to themselves, "We bear no grudge against them, these good lambs, we even love them: nothing is tastier than a tender lamb."

So when you read that do you associate yourself with the lambs or the sheep? Do you relate to the helpless, bitter little sheep, or the strong, confident birds of prey? I believe the human ego leads many of us to feel that we fall on the side of the birds. We are strong, we are clever, we are the stars of our own show. And we are most certainly not sheeple. I think the prevalence of motivational quotes on the internet is proof of this. Take, for example, this extremely reblogged, retweeted, and shared image: 

It's very inspiring, and it makes you feel like an exceptionally strong, independent, person. However, consider the millions of other people who see that image and read that quote and think themselves a ferocious wolf or a strong bird of prey. Is it not impossible for all of these people to be right? Sheep travel in herds, and Slave Values are supposed to be far more prevalent than Noble Values, so who is wrong? If we cannot all be wolves where are the sheep?

We would all rather think that we are independent of others expectations of us. It is also much more appealing to think of our own moral compass as being based in the good and active rather than based off of ressentiment and reactive. Perhaps that is why Slave Values exist at all; they are a response to those who feel that they should posses the noble mode of evaluation, but are self conscious that they do not, and therefore turn their own mildness and "bad"ness into a choice, rather than a trait. They think to themselves that they could have noble values. This is what Nietzsche refers to when he says trying to quiet one's strength is like trying to separate the flash from the lightening. If somebody truely posses a noble mode of evaluation, odds are they will embrace it.

So what about you? Do you think you are a wolf or a sheep?

Is revolution a thing of the past?

Throughout the history of mankind (yeah, I am starting out with that huge generalization), we rarely see a society with true equality. From the ancient texts emerging from Mesopotamia to the current state of America, we see a clear distinction between the upper and lower classes. Recently, there have been many studies that show some interesting statistics regarding our American upper class. In a recent study, it was found that "rich" people are more likely to lie, cheat, and break the law (link). Further, our inequality gap is rapidly increasing (link). Movements such as Occupy Wallstreet have set out to challenge the 1%, arguing that many wealthy individuals have not honestly earned their wealth, and that this unequal distribution of wealth is making it more difficult for poorer individuals to make a living. Clearly, there is a growing animosity between the have and the have not's, but is it as strong as it once was?

It's interesting to imagine oneself in the position of a 1%.Go take a quick gander at rich kids of instagram. Imagine yourself having the moral dilemma of what Ferrari you're going to drive today, or what type of champagne you'll down, or which one of dad's credit cards you're going to put a slight (but unnoticeable) dent in today. Imagine, from birth, that you never have to worry about money...in fact, you're worried about not spending ENOUGH money. Yeah, I'm craving a mimosa just thinking about it.

 Now, imagine the opposite. Imagine growing up on the streets, wondering if tonight's the night you're going to die from a combination of hypothermia and hunger. Imagine that you'd be content if someone just stopped to ask you how you were doing and offered you the last of the hamburger. Imagine that the last time you saw your family, they refused to let you into their house because they didn't agree with your lifestyle. Blah. Not as fun as the first thought.

Not to generalize the population of Rhodes College, although I'm going to do it anyways, you're probably somewhere in the upper middle class. I doubt many have experienced the latter example, perhaps some live as the first. But, I, personally reside very comfortably in the middle. I express sympathy for those "below" me and jealousy at those "above" me. But see what I did there? I've categorized those in different economic subsets as below and above me. Interesting.

Nietzche's first essay in the "Genealogy of Morals" explains how the terms 'good' and 'bad' developed their meanings. Historically, Nietzche asserts that the lower classes have always harbored contempt for the upper class. Also, historically speaking, the wealthy have traditionally defined what is "good" and what is "bad". Characteristics such as strength, power, and other things which create "progress" in life. Bad things being sickness, poverty, etc. On the other side of things, the poor, so fed up with the aristocrats and other wealthy individuals giving meaning to "good" and "bad", decided to attribute the word evil to what the aristocrats (oppressors in the mind of the poor) considered "good". Good, to the poor, are things which they could identify with--humility, altruism, etc. This turned into what Nietzche refers to as slave morality.

Of course, I can understand this contempt coming from the lower classes. However, both Nietzche and I question whether or not it's unnatural for the upper classes to not act like they possess the wealth that they do. Can you really tell a rich kid of instagram to not act like a rich kid of instagram? I would argue you can't.

However, as you see in history, humanity goes through periods where the rich will dominate (thus, attributing morals based on their wealth) and then will be overtaken by the lower classes. We see this in examples such as the Reformation and the French Revolution. Here, we see slave morality "romanticized" and taken to be better than wealthy morality.

Focusing again on America and our current state...like I said earlier, the large majority of the wealth is held by a very small minority. However, it is important to note that while the quality of life is really bad for a really big group of people, things (iphones, computers, television, etc) is still pretty available for people in lower classes. Unlike back in the day where the poor had nothing good going on in their lives, many poor today still have things like cell phones and television to distract themselves from the struggles of their lives. Of course, many don't, but many do too.

The point I'm trying to get at is that I feel like today's "slave morality" is not as progressive of that in the past. Much of what is considered to be "good" is still defined by the wealthy, and it seems like that isn't going to change. When you look at movements like Occupy Wallstreet, which were an utter fail, you begin to question what will actually change the state of overwhelming inequality. Further, I believe that the lower classes are actually in acceptance of wealthy morality. The desire for goods and wealth is still a main concern of those who do not possess those things. Instead of changing the state of morality in our country, those in the lower classes are simply trying to attain wealth so as to live the life of an upper class individual...which is completely understandable. I think this is because technology is being shoved down our throat as the only means to happiness.

In the past, those in the lower classes pushed hard to change the definition of good and bad. Now, there is a push to attain the wealthy definitions of good and bad. I hope this made sense.

Why the Nazis are NOT Nietzsche's Nobility

When first reading Nietzsche's "Genealogy of Morals," it is hard to avoid drawing parallels to the attempted extermination of the Jews by the Nazis in the 1930s, given Nietzsche's discussion of Aryans as nobles and his descriptions of Jews as the slave class.

However, in light of Nietzsche's analogy of lambs and birds of prey, it becomes clear that Nietzsche would not have viewed the attempted extermination of the Jewish people as an expression of strength by a noble class. If the Nazis were noble, we should be able to consider them as the birds of prey and Jews as lambs. But this cannot be extended to the Nazis, for what bird of prey would wish to completely exterminate it's prey? While birds of prey certainly exert their will on lambs, they also depend on them. Without the lambs, the birds of prey would be unlikely to survive, thus rendering their preying on the lambs as an act of necessity, not of pure aggression. Respect for one's enemy (or prey) defines nobility/birds of prey, for the noble "can endure no other enemy than one in whom there is nothing to despise and very much to honor!" (section 10). Thus, the birds of prey respect the lambs in that they prey on them according to need and not to the point of extinction. The Lion King's "circle of life" perfectly outlines this predator/prey relationship of respect.

But unlike the birds of prey, the Nazis sought to eliminate an entire group of people. They exhibit a slave mentality, as they viewed the Jews as "the evil enemy," and desired to be rid of them in order to protect their way of thinking, in much the same way that the lambs wished for the extermination of the birds of prey in order to protect them from being killed. Further, had the Nazis truly been examples of Nietzsche's nobles, they would not have been bothered by the Jews presence. For the noble "shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others" (section 10). Even if the Jews had been the "vermin" that the Nazis portrayed them as, it would not have warranted the Nazis' persecution of the Jewish people.

So while the Nazis may have cited Nietzsche to attempt to justify their actions, they were not acting as Nietzsche's nobility, but as slaves.

Magic Man: Paragon of Noble Values?

For those who were not aware of the children’s television juggernaut that is Adventure Time, I pity you. Here, allow me to introduce you to a character who appeared in this week's episode and is relevant to the topic at hand.

Per the clip, Magic Man is an incredibly powerful wizard who wanders the land teaching generous individuals (i.e. those who have succumbed to Nietzsche’s proposed ‘slavish lie’ of weakness being moral) “magical life lessons” which aim to yield only the conclusion that “he’s just a big jerk” (the episode's conclusion). Magic Man seems to embrace his identity as a Nietzscheian bird of prey, exerting his will and using his power as he sees fit apart from the slavish moral quandaries which would plague “sissy do-gooders” (as he calls them). In evaluating his character, there are two divergent paths one might take. The first is to assume that Magic Man’s ‘evil’ (in terms of slave values) is recognized as such by him and that he psychopathically seeks to do evil. The other option is that Magic Man does not recognize himself as taking a moral position when he acts (a property of noble values). We as viewers cannot know the character’s rationale for his actions (or perhaps you’re someone who doesn’t take dumb cartoons too seriously and you had no desire to know) and so here lies the problem, not with Nietzsche’s argument, but with the consequences of it: the actions and effects of the psychopath and the one who embraces noble values are in cases identical. People have accused those who have committed atrocities in this world of perverting Nietzsche, however in this (albeit fictional) case, adherence to Nietzsche’s philosophy also produces pain and suffering. It goes without saying (at least according to our apparent slave mentality) that Bashar Al-Assad should not be allowed to continue exerting his will against the Syrian people, but not according to the conclusions of Nietzsche. Perhaps as we wait for a supposed ‘peaceful solution’ in the weeks to come Al-Assad will take the opportunity to bring up a Nietzschian defense of his actions, accusing the moratorium on chemical weapons of being a sinister tool of the slave class’ power restriction initiatives or claiming that 'the subject' is a myth and he should not be punished for his will since he is inseparable from it and therefore not morally culpable for it. I imagine whatever happens, he’ll react as he has so far, like Magic Man.

Sociologist by day, Existentialist by night

The rumination of the "underground man," and more broadly, the focus of the Existentialist readers we’ve encountered thus far, narrow in on the apparent growing contempt for the individual, and subsequent growing obsession with the group, with society, with the era, with world history, etc. These authors, and I presume the authors will will encounter going forward, are realigning the philosophical paradigm from the nature of the group - or of humanity as a whole - to the peculiarities of individual experience. 

Despite my being an aspiring sociologist, an aspiring observer of patterns and commonalities in group behaviour, I too attribute the upmost value to contemplation on the uniqueness, the curiousness of individual experience. But these two concepts are not in the least bit contradictory. It would be naïve of the Existentialist to deny that social conditioning exist, to deny that one is not socialised into specific roles and scripts from birth. And it would be equally naïve of the sociologist to purport that conditioning controls the individual, that it determines one’s actions. Conditioning certainly suggests, encourages, and discourages certain behaviours, and does so by penalising nonconformity with alienation. It would be absurd that anyone deny the truth of such a phenomenon.  But sociology qua sociology is not prescriptive; it is does not tell one how to live, but rather informs us of particular material frameworks in which we live. Yes, sociology qua sociology is an academic practice, and therefore practice itself, the actually process of sociological inquiry, prioritises rationality over freedom. However, the conclusions drawn from sociology provide us with a better paradigm through which we regard our freedom. Or in other words, to what degree we have been tugged about by norms and the status quo. It is then up to the individual to decide how s/he will continue living, to what extent s/he wants to individuate; if the individual so desires, s/he can break from conformity, and weather the tide of alienation and ridicule provided by the mainstream. Or, one can continue to float lazily down the mainstream, kept afloat by the buoyancy of normative behaviour.  

Sociology highlights the ontological scripts that society provides us. It does not, however, write an alternative one.

(Despite Dr. J’s admonition that I refrain from speaking further about Sociology, I regard the blog as outside the classroom’s jurisdiction.)

Subjectivity and Existence

I have not been able to grasp “truth is subjectivity” so I have been looking into the end of Kierkegaard’s “Truth is Subjectivity” to try to understand. This section deals with the “contempt for the individual” and after confusing myself even more, I am going to share what I have come up with. Kierkegaard says that “truth is precisely the daring venture of choosing the objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite”(21). He believes there is a decision in subjectivity and in the quote he wrote that objective uncertainty is a necessary choice for truth. Is not wanting to be an actually existing individual an objective uncertainty? Objectively, humans do not want to be actually existing individuals (AEI), they fear being lonely and forgotten so they do not have any passion. This seems like a paradox to me: by not wanting to be an AEI, they must be aware of the possibility of their own existence meaning they potentially know they exist but they escape into science and history and ignore the thought of existence. There is uncertainty about one’s existence. By humans not wanting to be individuals, they cause themselves anxiety but ignore the realization that they exist. Is that fear of being an AEI considered passion even though they are not worried about being an AEI but about not being one? Passion can include worry about being an individual in a boundless environment, which in my opinion seems similar to humans not wanting to be AEI with their fear that they will be forgotten. When humans do not want to and do not believe they are AEI, does that not make them more of an AEI? The personal belief or disbelief that the individual exists is an inward, subjective reflection. Even if they do not consider existence, is it possible for those humans to still have inwardness? Maybe subconsciously they have repressed such thoughts. As previously mentioned, in subjectivity there is a decision. Is knowing that one is an AEI or distracting oneself from the thought both decisions, that is subjective decisions, that contribute to the overall concept of subjectivity. To summarize my thought process for this blog post: Kierkegaard says that objective uncertainty and passion of the infinite is truth. Humans who have contempt for the individual do not have passion and are lying to themselves. Maybe it is not a lie and they subconsciously know they are AEIs. Those who worry about being an individual and being forgotten, distract themselves. Truth is a paradox as is knowing and not knowing one is an AEI at the same time. This knowledge of existence would be inward but not all humans know it. The inwardness is subjective and existence is true. The way AEIs subjectively think they are an AEI or worry about being one, along with how the brain thinks subconsciously, helps me make more sense of “truth is subjectivity."