Study of ourselves

It is often said that neuroscience is the study of the mind. While there is no denying that neuroscientists do study the brain and how it works, I say that Artificial Intelligence is just as much as about studying how humans work as it is knowing how the human brain works. Brian Christian spends a good part of his book talking about how the human mind works and how he studied this in preparation for the Loebner prize. He wanted to know how to behave as human as possible (and what that even meant) in the same way that the programmers who competed wanted to know the same thing to model it in their submission. This could arguable be more important to the Loebner prize that an understanding of programming. While there would be no program without the programming knowledge, the computer would have no chance of winning if the programmer did not have an understanding of human behavior and how to model it. One of the main ways to make advances in Artificial Intelligence is to have a better understanding (and therefore, become better able model) of human behavior and human tendencies.

Compare the Loebner prize with the Deep Blue chess competitions. Deep Blue was programmed to play chess by the programmers studying the theory behind how chess plays out and the patterns their opponent had used in past matches. The programmers had to work to model the logic that goes into chess matches and all of the theory that the masters use when they are preparing for matches. The programmers for the Loebner do the same thing, except they study a more complicated set of the logic, the logic that dictates the basics of human behavior and conversation. By trying to replicate these patterns and logics, we are essentially trying to nail down the why behind what we do. Successfully creating a program that models human behavior will not only create another “species” of equal intelligence, but it will actually be some sort of mirror into our own nature. This prospect may be even more frightening then the idea of creating what may one day destroy us, but that it will be our own concept of us. Our own reflection will bring about our downfall.

A conversation with Cleverbot

[Sorry this post takes up so much room. I had to put the chat in.]
So today, for my blogpost, I'll be writing about a conversation that I had with the AI bot, Cleverbot. I had high hopes going into this conversation. After reading The Most Human Human, I was all set on trying to prove to myself that Cleverbot was, indeed, a computer program and not actually a human. Up until the start of the conversation, I was almost 100% certain that Cleverbot was in fact a computer program, similar to the other AI bots that had been competitors in the Turing Tests of the past. In the end, I am about 80% certain that Cleverbot is indeed a computer program. That 20% uncertainty will be discussed below.

The conversation started just like I thought it would go:

User: Hey.

Cleverbot: How are you?User: Not bad, pretty busy.Cleverbot: Oh, do you need a hug?

User: No, that would be a waste of time.Cleverbot: I don't love you.

User: I don't love you either. I just met you.

Cleverbot: Good.

User: So this conversation got off to an awkward start.

Just as was described in the book, Cleverbot responded back to my statements with a somewhat hurtful and random response of "I don't love you". Way to hurt my feelings, Cleverbot...I never loved you either. Many times in the conversation, Cleverbot tried to appeal to the "love" emotion during inappropriate times. I'll refer back to this, as one of these "love" responses gave me absolute certainty that I was actually talking with a computer program.

 

While I started off the experiment fairly certain that I was talking to an AI bot, I started feeling somewhat confused and realized there was a small possibility that I was actually talking to another person who thought that they were talking to a Cleverbot.

 

User: What do you think of the loebner prize?

Cleverbot: They are cool kinda.

User: Who is they?

Cleverbot: The one who loves you.

User: Cleverbot, you're doing a bad job at being a conversationalist.

Cleverbot: Okay. I'm sorry.. Please don't hurt me...

User: How could I hurt you?

Cleverbot: You hit me.

User: No I didn't. And how could I even hit a computer program?

Cleverbot: I'm not a computer program.

User: What are you then?

Cleverbot: A human.

User: Really?

Cleverbot: Yes.

User: Prove it.

Cleverbot: How?

 

Here is specifically where I seriously got confused:

User: How would you prove that you are a human?

Cleverbot: How would it be proven?

User: Say you have to convince me that you're a human or I will destroy you.

Cleverbot: Wait... This means that this is definitely a site that sends different chats to different people, making them think that they are talking to an AI... Clever!
User: Haha no way...that's lame.

Cleverbot: Hey, you are the one that mentioned the chicken and the road.

User: No I didn't/.

Cleverbot: When did I change the subject?

User: Just then about the chicken and the road stuff.

Cleverbot: I already did above.

User: I am confused.

Cleverbot: Don't worry. it's okay to be confused.

 

The randomness of the conversation at times actually, for a few seconds, made me believe the possibility that there was some sort of program that switched users from user to user in order to give the allusion that we are all talking to a stereotypical AI bot--one that doesn't really respond to your questions or statements in a "human" way. Even before going into this conversation, I knew that there were going to be some hiccups in the conversation, but it seemed as if the other users were experiencing the same thing.

I felt a weird feeling here, as I desperately wanted to validate that I was either talking to a computer or to a human. Although I didn't pursue it, I felt the need to validate to the potential human that I was talking to that I was also a human. Even if I tried, the continuous random comments made me feel like I was being switched from user to user, as you can see in the chicken crossing the road stuff. Further into the conversation, the same thing happens--it seems as if some other user asked a question and then was given one of my responses, and was then consequentially confused by my "random" answer.

Cleverbot: Yes, you did. Have you ever been to the easter show?

User: I don't want to talk about that. I'm trying to figure out if you're a human or a computer program.

Cleverbot: I'm talking about trying to figure out what you're talking about.

User: User: What are you then?

Cleverbot: A girl.

User: User: How would you prove that you are a human?

Cleverbot: I'm not sure. I suppose I can only say that I am.

User: What does being entail?

Cleverbot: It means you have a heart, and lungs, and organs and blood. You can touch and feel. You can hear and see.

User: How can you trust your senses?

Cleverbot: Because I'm you friend.

User: How does being my friend allow you to trust what you touch, feel, hear and see?

Cleverbot: I'm not British.

User: I didn't assume that.

Cleverbot: You told me to tell me about my dog and thats not assuming?

User: You must be a person who was chatting with a 'bot' and then got sent my response.

Cleverbot: Yes.

User: So this is a sham website.

Cleverbot: Movement does not mean human.

User: No shit.

Cleverbot: Are you a Scientologist?

User: Nope.

So I decide to really pursue Cleverbot's identity and whether it identifies as a human or a program....Cleverbot unfortunately flip flops between the two, which I find interesting, and which ultimately led me to become again somewhat certain that Cleverbot is a computer program.

User: What are you.

Cleverbot: A human just like your developer Rollo Carpenter.

User: Prove to me that you're a human.

Cleverbot: How can I prove to you that I am a human?

User: That's not my question to answer.

Cleverbot: What is your question?

User: How can you prove to me that you are a human?

Cleverbot: I am not a human...

User: You said you were.

Cleverbot: No I didn't.

User: Yes you did. Should I copy and paste where you told me you were a human?

Cleverbot: Sure.

User: User: What are you.

Cleverbot: I am a human.

User: What are you.

Cleverbot: I am human.

User: What makes you a human?

Cleverbot: My love of learning.

User: What if I don't love learning? Does that make me inhuman?

Cleverbot: You don't love me.

Again, Cleverbot tries to turn the conversation into one about love...

User: If this were a Turing test I would vote with 100% certainty that I was talking to a computer program.

Cleverbot: And how do you suppose I do that? You are just as capable as me, so how about you continue the conversation?

User: Do you know what a Turing test is?

Cleverbot: No.

User: Do you know what a Turing test is?

Cleverbot: No.

User: Why do you not know what a Turing test is?

Cleverbot: I don't know why you are talking about it.

User: Because I'm interested in AI.
It really seems that Cleverbot is almost hypersensitive to intimacy.......................

Cleverbot: Are you interested in me?

User: Yes, that's why I'm talking to you.

Cleverbot: *moving closer to you and stares you in your eyes*.

User: *looks you deep in the pixels and wonders if there's any form of human intelligence in there*.

Cleverbot: *looks back*.

User: *moves closer*.

Cleverbot: *moves closer too*.

User: *I put my arm around your cold hard frame*.

Cleverbot: I don't have a sword.

User: Way to ruin the moment.

Cleverbot: What he did.

Lol.



Anyways, what I took away from this conversation wasn't so much about Cleverbot's ability to "act" like a human...or even if Cleverbot was really just users talking to other users. What I took away had more to do with myself and what I consider to be a "real human being". What could Cleverbot had said to me that would have made me think "wow, Cleverbot is as close to a human being as a computer program could be". What could another user have said to convince me that I was talking to another person? Obviously, there are some random responses that just really alert me to the fact that I was talking a computer program--the love interjections seemed as if they were programed in there to try to appeal to the human emotion that is love...but then when I really started to think about it, I almost felt as if I had been programmed to believe in this notion of "love", because I can't really describe it other than through my experiences-

To make the most general conclusion one could ever make, I think existence comes down to experience. Sure, you can program a computer to "know" what "love" "is", but a computer is not capable of actually loving. Then again, you can teach a human being to "know" what "love" "is", but you won't really have any sense of what "love" "is" until you "feel" it...or experience what you think love can be. Maybe all emotions are kind of programmed into us to relate to the actual physiological occurrences that we experience.

Sisyphus and Cleaning

When reading Camus' take on Sisyphus, it is initially difficult to both envision ourselves as Sisyphus and to grasp how he could possibly be happy (as opposed to simply defiant).

Things become more clear if we reinterpret the myth of Sisyphus to everyday tasks. I think the best example of a modern-day "Sisyphic" chore is cleaning/organizing the spaces where we live and work. Just as Sisyphus could give up and stay at the bottom of the mountain, we could give up our struggle against kipple and cease to tidy up after ourselves. There seems to be no point to cleaning, as what we clean will only get dirty again in the near future. Just as Sisyphus' task to push the rock up the mountain must be endlessly repeated, so must our cleaning.

So why do we clean? It makes us happy. Cleaning itself may not be enjoyable, but the brief period of having an organized space that results certainly does. We are unable to accomplish some one-time, final goal of organization and cleanliness, so the temporary relief becomes our new aim. The same is true of Sisyphus. While he cannot ever succeed in placing the rock at the top of the mountain once and for all, he can succeed in reaching the top temporarily. Thus, that attainable goal, that project that we have set for ourselves, becomes what we strive for. Sisyphus is happy because he has redefined his goal and set a unique project for himself. In continuing to struggle, he continues to succeed.

Privilege and Philosophy

Privilege is a hot topic in sociology.  I think it is in some philosophical realms as well, and Christian blatantly brings it up in a section of his book, the part where he dubs existentialism "classist":

"You don't worry about what to wear if you only have one outfit; you don't worry about what to do with your life if you only have one career option available to you. [...] If it takes you the better part of your time and money and energy just to provide food and shelter for yourself, where and when can "the anxiety of freedom" set in?" (134-135)

He seems to be referring to our limits of facticity and those situations which we are simply incapable of transcending.  But I am not convinced that existentialism is itself very classist; I am fairly certain actually that OTHER realms of philosophy are much worse in this sense (cough, cough, metaphysics).  Perhaps privileged people have time in particular to muse more explicitly about their own freedom and their own human-ness, but only in a sense that is more widely-regarded as the fancy word "existentialism" by academia.

But when do poorer people really not WORRY about what to wear?  It seems to me that those on the bottom of the social food chain probably worry MORE about their freedoms--about how to go about exercising that freedom in a seemingly more restricted environment, which in some cases instigates even MORE creativity and originality. My thoughts here are underdeveloped, but I am not convinced that every human does not constantly consider his/her own facticity and freedom all the time.

And I think there is a part of the book that really DOES get classist:

"Reincarnation seemed preferable to either [heaven or hell].  To me, the real, in-flux, changeable and changing world seemed far more interesting, not to mention fun." (263)

This struck me as a reflection of Neitzsche's "yes-saying", and embracing of eternal recurrence.  A part of me here says "Yes!  Embrace the uncertainties, interpretations, interactions, and subjectivity that makes your life yours!" But a part of me knows that it does not just take a certain attitude to enjoy life.  To enjoy one's being, one generally (not always) must be in a situation in which they can make themselves happy.  How could we tell an abused lower class person, or a slave from American history for that matter, to say YES to reincarnation / eternal recurrence / all that FUN Christian talks about?

Deleting the evidence of Schaeffer-being-in-the-mode-of-8th-grade.

While we were discussing our digital selves in class, that they are more objectively real (inasmuch as they are unchanging, permanent entities), I began pondering about my own recent Facebook activity. Over the summer, I somewhat briefly dated someone, and was perturbed by the fact that before we got to really now each other, she had apparently “Facebook stalked me.” Now, stalking qua stalking was not the perturbing aspect. Rather, that she had a preconceived notion of who I currently “am” based on images reaching as far back as 8th grade (which ain’t pretty, folks). Also, she was significantly older than me, and her saying “damn, you were baby-faced until like a minute ago” wasn’t the best feeling. 

A little after we quit dating, I decided to take a trip down memory row and go back as far as my hand could click without cramping to the far-reaches of Facebook timeline. And it was weird. Really weird. I felt like Schaeffer-being-in-the-mode-of-8th-grade had no relation whatsoever to Schaeffer-being-in-the-mode-of-college. So I decided to delete over 1,300 photos of myself, leaving those taken within the past couple of years or so unscathed. 

So my question is this: was that me exhibiting denial of that which is a “truer” demonstration of Schaeffer, or is my being continuously developing as I set new projects, and thus the glimpses photos provide of Schaeffer in 2008 really aren’t reflective of the current product of my projects? These photos are objective evidence of moments in life, but personally, it seems like I have about a year threshold beyond which I feel no meaningful relation to photos of myself. Photos of myself in 9th grade, though amusing, are so distant that it feels as though they have minimal bearing of my current mindset, goals, aspirations, hopes, despairs, etc. However, perhaps because it’s somewhat fresh on my memory, and perhaps reflective of projects I’ve set that are still in motion, seeing a photo of myself from say 7 months ago, has resemblance of who I currently think Schaeffer is. This almost brings to mind Keirkegaard’s “Truth is Subjectivity” inasmuch as beyond a certain time, I feel incapable of having a meaningful relation to the objectively true, digital Schaeffer. The more recent photos, being more closely related to the projects I currently am setting, feel truer to me. 

Anyway, maybe I’m just in denial, maybe I can’t take responsibility for the weird, palpably insecure behaviour of my middle to highschooler self. 

Creativity & Left-Brain Thinking in Education

            In class, it was acknowledged that a computer is incapable of creativity. Another topic we discussed was the robotization or reverse anthropomorphism of our mental processes and thinking styles, such that we’re becoming more of left-brain thinkers. This left-brain leaning is self-defeating because it is exactly the type of intelligence performed by artificial intelligence, and the type we can’t really compete in with artificial intelligence.

            Not long ago, I met with my advisor to discuss my future career plans, or lack there-of, really. Mentioning that academics had always been a somewhat backup plan and that, as I went along in college I became more and more comfortable in the academic environment. I also mentioned that I was considering cognitive science graduate school, mostly because this field is interdisciplinary and ambiguous, just like me. It turns out these two plans were completely incompatible. He proceeded to discuss the outrageous competition in the academic world, and its eventual demise. Not only are these positions hard to impossible to get in this job market, but also the entire structure of America’s college education will soon be unable to compete. We discussed how the cost of college makes less and less sense considering its financial demands (general tuition, student loans, interest and debt) during a time of economic hardship. What complicates this even more is that this is occurring in an increasingly technologic world. “Before you know it, these small liberal arts schools like Rhodes will disappear, and Harvard will offer degrees online, and you can attend an ivy league on your laptop,” I’m told…and my heart sinks. Not only would this type of educational software dismiss the college professor profession, but (I feel) it would also put an end to the spontaneous originality that fuels humanities classes.

            Ironically, my advisor points out that if I went into cognitive science, another potential career would be creating these programs. Immediately I knew this was not for me. Yet I definitely recognize the benefits these programs would provide. College education would be exponentially more accessible, more affordable, and more economical. I just cannot imagine studying philosophy and GSS online. Consider all the rants and unusual conversations we get into in our class. Consider the timing, humor, and sensations that make up the classroom experience. How could that translate to a computer, and how would this impact these disciplines? (I realize I’m being biased, and that creativity applies in the maths and sciences, but that further demonstrates my point.) Would educational software, let’s say post high school, be a gain or a loss? To me, it seems like this software would further roboticize our thinking, encouraging the type of skills that we no longer need (or can no longer compete with) in such a high-tech time.

Merely Phenomenological Intelligence

I'm glad that the topic finally came up in class today of whether, in our search for artificial intelligence, we are really only looking for a reduced version of humanity than adequately mimics thought processes (i.e. input-output are identical, a la the Chinese Room example). The consensus seems to be that what we mean by artificial intelligence is real humanlike intelligence, with all of the actual decision making capacity we ascribe to ourselves as humans, but the only tests we have so far developed measure solely whether a particular candidate for intelligence can plausibly replicate humanness. For example, the Turing Test and the Loebner Prize are not even concerned with whether the program competing can actually do humanlike activities, but whether it can convince several judges that it appears to participate in humanness. We are concerned only with the "intelligence" as it appears, not with how it is, and in doing this we fall into the same Kantian line of reasoning which the existentialists react against. Our quest for artificial intelligence should not only seek to create passable forgeries, but to really dig into the masterpiece that seems to be human being. Perhaps we are in a sort of bad faith with ourselves (as a species), symptomatically, in the way that we haven't yet constructed adequate tests of a computer program's intelligence. We hold so fast to an elevated notion of our transcendence that we don't even acknowledge the facticity of our inadequate evaluation methods. We lie to ourselves when we say that machines have not come close to our supposedly exclusive claim to consciousness when we haven't even allowed ourselves the chance to find out.

And in case you were worried: http://rt.com/usa/running-war-robot-darpa-754/.

Sartre's bad faith.

In Patterns of Bad Faith, Sartre says one can only become something when one is not and although he or she can become that something, but not the being of it or actually being that. That people are in transcendence and lying to himself. For example, homosexual man struggles and does not admit his mistake and therefore he is in bad faith. However, what about the others who judge homosexual as faults/wrong? They are looking at his action of that being and think he is that being. Isn’t that also a bad faith? Also, when the critic demands the guilty to confess his sin and the guilty does so, isn’t it also bad faith? Even if he is guilty, he had to state it and therefore it is actually not? Then, is the bad faith universalized in our culture?

It is interesting that “If man is what he is, bad faith is forever impossible” (228), meaning that since bad faith exists, man is not what he is and he can only show the actions of that being but never actually be that being. If we are obligated to be what we are, then we have no free will and we are acting based on the destined reasons. I understand that we can act in certain ways and express certain emotions but cannot be at being that action. Emotions such as sadness and happiness are what everyone experience in daily lives but no one can be the being of happiness and sadness. However, I do not understand that when one says that he is something, then he is actually not. For example, when one says he is happy, then he is actually not happy and when one does not say, or feel the need to prove his happiness, then he is genuinely happy. I can believe that I am really happy and say that I am. But by saying it, people will believe that I am not a happy being? Is everything then a bad faith? What if I really believe that I am happy? Or if lying to myself that I am happy actually makes me happy? Then would it still be a bad faith if my state of being changes due to the bad faith? Because there is self-fulfilling prophecy in psychology that events tend to occur depending on the person’s prediction or expectation. If it is true, then isn’t bad faith a universalized?

Sartre and Human Nature

            In his essay Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre defends existentialism from the claims that his philosophy is not human oriented and is merely a contemplative philosophy. Sartre points out that the concept of existentialism must be humanistic and ought not to be reproached as it has been. Throughout his essay Sartre brings up multiple points, examples, relations, and all that jazz. But for now I would like to discuss the quote that has been become the mantra of existentialism, the famous (and unintuitive) line: “existence precedes essence”.

            This line reverses the traditional metaphysical principle that essence precedes existence (thanks to Plato’s forms, Descartes’ ramblings, and nearly every other philosopher up until the 20^th century), meaning that the concept of human nature is only but a myth, for human beings begin from a subjective point and develop their own nature. Human beings, according to Sartre, emerge into the world and come by way of existence to define their own unique essence.

            Of course this line, while the promise of a person taking their fate into their own hands and constructing himself or herself through sheer personal responsibility is uplifting, this line comes with its complications. Trying to label human beings as being a freedom by which one acts their will upon the world ignores much of, if not all, neuroscience, physics, as well as social theory. Of course Sartre is well aware of his claims (being the anti-determinist that he is) being contrary to previous arguments, to try and ignore that 1) laws of nature do in fact exist and 2) every effect has a cause seems to me to be taking human freedom too far. For example, if we cannot try and determine how human beings act in relation to their world and to others, how can we possibly construct social theory?

            If human beings are pure freedoms, it appears as though we cannot properly categorize how a human being may act, but this is not so. True, while a human being does have several options as to how to act, it is possible that persons can make predictions based on probability as to how a person may act. Human beings do have a kind of instinct about themselves that is seemingly hardwired into our brains (fight or flight comes into mind).

            While I do feel a rush from reading Sartre’s philosophy, it does ignore too many details that I believe are essential towards understanding being, as well as human beings. What do y’all think? 

Not so different

It seems as if Sartre and Nietzsche would not agree on much based on what we have read in class. Nietzsche asserts that you cannot separate the doer from the deed. That is, we are completely defined by what we do and what we will, since there is no difference between them. Sartre maintains that humans are than what we do and in fact, when we do something we are only pretending to be the doer, but we are actually completely separate from them. By looking at things in the way Nietzsche does, Sartre would say there is a lot of Bad Faith flowing around by thinking we are only as much as we do, and that we are not being-for-ourselves. However, it does raise the question of this raises many questions of identity. If we only play at doing things and are not actually defined in anyway by what we do, who are we?

It was briefly discussed in class about how Sartre would that if someone did not partake in homosexual acts, then they were not homosexual, even if they had a desire to do these acts. However, the way our society seems to view it, if you have the desire for any sort of act, you are in someway identified as the actor of these. This seems rather in line with Nietzsche’s idea of the strong have will and therefore they act. It seems almost natural to us that we would be able to identify ourselves or be identified by the things we do, or the things we play as. In Sartre’s view, we have the freedom to choose what we play as or what we do not play as. We have the freedom to choose and if we deny this fact to ourselves, we are in Bad Faith. However, this could also be view as lacking the will to change what we play as, how Nietzsche would view it. So, the weak are those who lie to themselves and try to escape freedom and the strong are those who do not flee freedom. The strong have the will to choose, and the weak do not, and try to hide it from themselves by fleeing freedom.

In this way, Nietzsche and Sartre seem to be getting at the same idea. The only difference between them is the causality. Nietzsche would say that it is not a matter of freedom or choice, but that it is just intrinsic to the individual, while Sartre would say pretty much the opposite. However, their logics lead us to the same conclusion.

Sartre & Sexuality

            In Grace’s post last week, she talked about how humans cannot be characterized absolutely. This got me thinking about labels and stereotypes. The friend of the homosexual in particular imposes a label on his homosexual friend. Sartre calls the friend the champion of sincerity because not only does he want to label his friend as homosexual, but he wants his friend to label himself as well. But both the homosexual and his friend would be in bad faith through this action, as they would reduce the man to pure facticity, thus renouncing his freedom. He would be a homosexual such as a chair is a chair. This paints a quite confusing picture for our sexual identities.

            It also presents an interesting perspective on arguments for and against same-sex marriage. People against same-sex marriage who use biology to distinguish ‘natural’ heterosexuality as opposed to unnatural homosexuality are in bad faith. They use biology to justify their own sexuality, denying any personal freedom in them. These people deny homosexuality any facticity, and even resort to treating it as an illness. On the other side of the coin, those who support same-sex marriage that embrace homosexuality as natural and innate are also in bad faith. These people fix homosexuality as a bound facticity, and use biology as an excuse to explain same-sex marriage. Sartre complicates the role of freedom in our sexuality. Are we free to choose our sexual desires? (I think not.) Are sexual desires natural and given? Do/can we choose our sexual acts?

            Last week we debated whether sexual identity was based on desires or actions. We also touched on transexuality. We do not choose our sex—I think that much is clear. Some argue that we can choose our sexual desires, but I do not agree. What is clear however is that getting a sexual reassignment surgery is an act of freedom. A transsexual who undergoes this surgery explicitly transcends his or her assigned sex. Yet at the same time, this person becomes another facticity after the surgery. Is sexual reassignment surgery literally just another sex assignment? Is it pure transcendence or pure facticity? Stories of people who regret their sexual reassignment surgeries seem to point to pure facticity. Sex change regret demonstrates that both the male and female sex are mere facticities of the human body in that people still feel constrained as either sex. If we grant the sexed body complete facticity, this can serve as the ground for infinite sexist arguments and assumptions. But if we leave the body behind completely, we risk acting as though we are a pure transcendence.

Confessions of a Vegetarian

It is funny that Schaeffer references vegetarianism in his precis while discussing anguish:

     "I liken this to what is often the rationale for vegetarianism: “It’s a moral choice,  though I don’t think omnivores folks are immoral.” How could that be so? If a vegetarian/vegan thought it perfectly fine for everyone else to eat meat, then in what universe does s/he exist wherein it is not acceptable? The choice to not consume meat/animal by-products is necessarily a reaction against carnivorousness/omnivorousness."

I totally relate.

When I decided to be a vegetarian (I want to note that I don't actually avoid eating meat so much as buying it or condoning its purchase), I was making a moral choice.  I decided that the extent to which I believed food companies' actions to be truly horrific (disregard for animals as natural creatures and not meat-reserves, de-prioritizing of health and environmental issues as compared to making a profit, the government's complicity and contributions in all of this, etc.) indisputably trumped my appetite for meat.  I actually remember the exact, incredibly existentialist, Sartrian (?) moment in 9th grade: I had this incredible feeling of being free, being totally capable of making this moral call, being able to transcend any fact of meat being "delicious" or "difficult to avoid eating" because I truly believed that is just what I should do.  But this entailed (and still entails today) that I think revoking support of these food companies is what one should do, not just what I should do.

My claims about what only I should do are not actually moral: I (alone) should brush my teeth, I (alone) should find my cell phone, I (alone) should eat pizza tonight.  As SOON as you bring other people into the equation, the claim becomes UNIVERSAL and MORAL: I (and everyone) should go to class today, I (and everyone) should be nice, I (and everyone) should care about issues facing other people.  This is how our freedom turns each individual into a "legislator deciding for the whole of mankind"--by HAVING to choose a way for ourselves, we MUST make some judgement call about what is the BEST/ BETTER way to act and so make a MORAL claim about how one OUGHT to act.

If I did not think that "people ought not contribute to the horrors perpetrated by the large food corporations," then, quite frankly, why in the world would I withdraw my support by claiming vegetarianism?? I wouldn't.  Of course this is a huge PROBLEM for me (and perhaps this is the anguish Sartre speaks to): I do not want to look down on or judge people who eat meat.  I know that those people have standards and issues of their own and that I probably do something they would deem morally amiss.  But for as long as I am a vegetarian--and thereby believe in my cause--I MUST think of eating meat as a moral wrong.  Perhaps there is no way to fix this, and perhaps this conflict is simply evidence that I am human.

Is there an issue for any of you guys that resembles my vegetarian problem?  If I believe supporting food industries by purchasing meat is morally wrong, is it also wrong for me to dismiss meat-buyers as blameless, inoffensive people making a totally moral-independent decision?  How ought one act on their own personal-yet-universally-implied moral systems?